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THE UNFINISHED "CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
REVOLUTION" OF POST-DEMOCRATIZATION
SOUTH KOREA
KUK CHO*
I. INTRODUCTION
The nationwide June Struggle of 1987 led to the collapse of Korea's
authoritarian regime and opened a road toward democratization.' Under the
authoritarian regime, the "crime control" value dominated over the "due process"
value in regards to criminal procedure.2 The Constitution's Bill of Rights was
merely nominal, and criminal law and procedure were no more than instruments
for maintaining the regime and suppressing those dissident. It was not a
coincidence that the June Struggle was sparked by the death of a dissident student
tortured during police interrogation.
3
The new 1987 Constitution brought a significant change in the theory and
practice of the Korean criminal procedure. Explicitly stipulating the idea of due
process in criminal procedure,4 the Bill of Rights in the Constitution has become a
living document.5 The 1988 and 1995 amendments to the Korean Criminal
Procedure Code 6 [hereinafter "CPC"] have also strengthened the procedural rights
of criminal suspects and defendants to some degree. The newly established Korean
Constitutional Court and the Korean Supreme Court have made important
*The Author is an Assistant Professor of Law, Seoul National University College of Law, Korea. He
received an LL.B. in 1986 and an LL.M. in 1989 from Seoul National University College of Law; an
LL.M. in 1995 and a J.S.D. in 1997 from the University of California at Berkeley School of Law; was a
Visiting Scholar, University of Leeds Centre for Criminal Justice Studies, U.K. (1998); a Visiting
Research Fellow; University of Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, U.K. (1998). Korean names in
this article are given in the Korean name order, with the family name first. The names of the Korean
authors who have published in English are given as they are in their publications.
1. For information regarding the June Struggle, see James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987
Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 221 (1991).
2. For information regarding these two competing values in criminal process, see HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 151 (1968).
3. See CARTER J. ECKERT ET AL., KOREA OLD AND NEW: A HISTORY 381-82 (1990).
4. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA [heonbeop] art. 12(1)(3), available at
www.assembly.go.kr/english/laws/constitution/constitution2.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002)
[hereinafter "THE KOREAN CONST."].
5. See Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 71, 73-75 (1997).
6. See generally The Korean Criminal Procedure Code [hyeongsa sosongbeop] (Law No. 341,
Sept. 23, 1954, last revised Dec. 13, 1997 as Law No. 5454) [hereinafter "CPC"].
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decisions for such rights.
However, a number of problems still remain which disturb the change in the
Constitution and overshadow the constitutional procedural rights. Police practices
of avoiding the warrant requirements for arrest and search-and-seizure have
continued. Guarantees of procedural rights for criminal suspects in police
interrogation still remain incomplete and fragile. Investigators enjoy their
dominant role in the criminal procedure scheme, while citizens are often treated
merely as an object of the investigation. The judiciary is reluctant to exclude
illegally obtained confessions and physical evidence in trials.
This article examines the basic system of Korean criminal procedure after
democratization, and analyzes its problem from the standpoint of the
"constitutionalization of criminal procedure." First, it starts with a brief review of
the implication of the shift brought by the 1987 Constitution. Second, it outlines
the basic system of Korean criminal procedure, focusing on the advancement of
the guarantee of procedural rights. Third, it explores the legal provisions of the
CPC, the Police Duty Law, and police practices which block the further
advancement of Korean criminal procedure. Finally, this article reviews the
passive position of the Korean Supreme Court on the exclusionary rule.
II. OUTSET OF THE "CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE" AFTER
THE 1987 KOREAN CONSTITUTION
Under the authoritarian regime established after the May 16th military coup in
1961, democracy in South Korea was nominal, and the Korean Constitution was
akin to the "Emperor's new clothes." Illegal police practices including torture,
illegal arrest and detention were widespread in the criminal process. Beating,
threatening, and torture by water or electricity were routinely applied to political
dissidents.
Let us turn to some highly profiled cases in the 1980s (although there are
many other similar cases under the regime). Supporters for President Kim Dae-
Jung, a political dissident at that time, were severely tortured when arrested for
their alleged conspiracy to overthrow the state in 1980. 7 In particular, those who
violated the National Security Law were brutally tortured, and accused of being
"pro-enemy leftists."8 For instance, Presidential Secretary Lee Tae-Bok and
Congressman Kim Geun-Tae, who were then leaders of the democratization
movement, were brutally tortured when arrested for the violation of the National
7. Henry Scott Stokes, Seoul's Censors and Press Distort Dispatches From US., N.Y. TIMES,
September 4, 1980, at A9.
8. Torture Claimed in Dissident Case, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, May 7, 1982, at 332
B3; Henry Scott Stokes, Ex-General Becomes a Key Figure in Seoul Politics, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1982,
§ 1, at 4.
9. See Stokes, supra note 8. See also, Jun Kwan-Woo, S. Korean 'Torturer' Gives Himself Up
After 11 Years On the Run, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, October 29, 1999; John Larkin, Found: Torturer
Who Hid In a Toilet, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, November 6, 1999, at 19.
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Security Law in 1980 and in 1983 respectively.9 In 1987, Professor Kwon In-Sook,
then a labor movement activist, was sexually abused by a policeman when
arrested, and Park Jong-Chul, a dissident student, was suffocated to death in the
bathtub during police torture.10 Besides political dissidents, ordinary people also
had to go through the cruel investigation process. Illegally-obtained confessions
and physical evidence were usually admitted by the Court to prove a defendant's
guilt." From the standpoint of human rights, it was no more than a "Dark Age,"
when the procedural rights of criminal suspects and defendants were nothing but
meaningless rhetoric.
The June Struggle of 1987 opened a new era of democracy and gave birth to
the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution established a blueprint for the
"constitutionalization of criminal procedure" in Korea and created the Korean
Constitutional Court as a watchtower to monitor unconstitutional laws and police
practices.
First, Article 12 (1) and (3) of the Constitution have explicitly incorporated
the principle of due process in criminal procedure. According to the Constitutional
Court, the principle is "to guarantee not only the legality of the procedure but also
the legitimateness of the procedure."' 12 The Court made sure that the principle of
due process was a core value to penetrate and control all stages of criminal
procedure, stating:
The principle of due process requires that both the formal
procedure described by the law and the substantial content of the
law be reasonable and just.... In particular, it declares that the
whole criminal procedure should be controlled from the
standpoint of guaranteeing the constitutional basic rights.13
Second, the Bill of Rights in the 1987 Constitution provides very detailed
provisions regarding criminal procedural rights, including strict requirements for
obtaining judicial warrants for compulsory measures, 14 the right not to be
tortured," privilege against self-incrimination, 16 right to counsel, 17 right to be
10. Former Policemen Arrested on Sexual Harassment Charges, UNITED PRESS INT'L, April 9,
1988e; Court Sentences Former Police Officer For Sexual Harassment, UNITED PRESS INT'L, July 23,
1988; AFP-AP-Seoul, Seoul Student Water Tortured Police Admit, TORONTO STAR, January 19, 1987,
at A5; AP-Seoul, 2 S. Korean Policeman Charged with Murder in Student Death, L. A. TIMES, January
19, 1987, at 12.
11. See, e.g. Decision of Nov. 9, 1988, 88 Kohap 548 (Pusan District Court); Decision of Oct. 13,
1981, 81 Do 2160 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Mar. 13, 1984, 84 Do 36 (Korean Supreme
Court).
12. See Decision of Dec. 24, 1992, 92 heon ka 8 (Korean Constitutional Court); Decision of July
29, 1993, 90 heon ba 35 (Korean Constitutional Court).
13. Decision of Dec. 26, 1996, 94 heon ba I (Korean Constitutional Court).
14. KOREAN CONST. [heonbeop], supra note 4, at arts. 12(3), 16.
15. Id. at art. 12(2).
16. Id.
17. Id. at art 12(4).
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informed of the reason of arrest or detention,18 right to request judicial hearing for
19 20
arrest or detention,9 exclusionary rule of illegally obtained confession, protection
against double jeopardy,2' right to fair trial,22 right to speedy and open trial,23
presumption of innocence,24 and right to compensation for the suspect and
defendant found innocent.25 These rights incorporated in the Constitution reflect
the Korean people's desire to guarantee their human rights which had been
nominal under authoritarian regime.
Besides these changes, it is noteworthy that in 1995, two former presidents,
Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, were prosecuted and found guilty for leading
the December 12th coup of 1979, and for killing many civilians in Kwangju in
1980. The case was symbolic of the change in Korean society.26
In brief, the new Constitution has required that criminal procedure be under
the control of the Constitution and has provided the detailed Bill of Rights to
guarantee the procedural rights of criminal suspects and defendants. In this
context, the "constitutionalization of criminal procedure" had begun.
1II. THE OUTLINE OF THE REFORMED KOREAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AFTER
DEMOCRATIZATION
Following the constitutional request in some degree, the CPC was revised in
1988 and 1995. Section III outlines and reviews the principles of the revised
Korean criminal procedure.
18. Id. at art. 12(5).
19. Id. at art. 12(6).
20. KOREAN CONST. [heonbeop], supra note 4, at art. 12(7).
21. Id. at art. 13(1).
22. Id. at art. 27(1).
23. Id. at art. 27(3).
24. Id. at art. 27(4).
25. Id. at art. 28.
26. In 1995, two retroactive laws were passed to overcome the statute of limitations which
prevented the prosecution of them. The first is the Act on the Non-Applicability of the Statutory
Limitations to Crimes Destructive of the Constitutional Order (heuncheongchilseo pakoepeomchoe eui
kongsosihyo e kwanhan teukryepeop), Law No. 5028, Dec. 21, 1995. It excludes the application of the
statutory limitations to crimes of insurrection, rebellion, and benefiting the enemy. The second is the
Special Act on the May 18 Democratic Movement (5.18 minchuhwa wundong deung e kwanhan
teukboelpeop), Law No. 5029, Dec. 21, 1995. It allows prosecution of the leaders of the 1979 coup and
the Kwangju massacre by the military junta in 1980. Although the constitutionality of the second Act
was challenged in the Korean Constitutional Court, the Court ruled that the laws were constitutional
since lexpraevia pertains to punishability, not prosecution. In addition, the law was held to be in the
public interest since it punishes anti-democratic criminal behavior and restore justice. See Decision of
Feb. 16, 1996, 96 heon ka 2 (Korean Constitutional Court). The Seoul District Court sentenced Chun to
death while Roh received 22-and-a-half year imprisonment. On appeal to the Seoul High Court, Chun's
sentence was reduced to life imprisonment and Roh's prison sentence was reduced to 17 years. After
the election of Kim Dae-Jung in 1997, President Kim Young-Sam pardoned Chun and Roh just before
leaving office. See David Holley, Jailed South Korean Ex-Presidents To Get Pardons, Politics: Kim
Young Sam and His Elected Successor Agree to Release Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Toe Woo in Bid for
"National Harmony, "L. A. TIMES, December 20, 1997, at A10.
VOL. 30:3
"CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION" OF KOREA
A. Investigation
1. The Investigative Authorities
The investigative authorities are composed of two bodies. First, police are a
subsidiary organ of the prosecution, lacking independent powers of investigation.
They conduct investigations under the direction and supervision of prosecutors.
27
Some minor offenses, which are punishable by fines of not more than 200,000
Won (currently equivalent to about U.S. $170) or detention for less than thirty
days, may be brought by the chief of police before the court without a formal
indictment. 28 The police have attempted to gain more autonomy, but have failed
both because there exists deep-rooted public distrust of the police, and because
prosecutors, who were reluctant to share investigative powers, strongly opposed
the change.29
Second, prosecutors retain full authority for both investigation and
prosecution in Korea,30 under a "principle of monopoly" [Anklagemonopol]. They
are also assumed to be semi-judicial agents [Justizbeh6rde] in Korea. 31 Although
democratization after 1987 led to the weakening of the police and the intelligence
agency's powers, the power of prosecutors has not been damaged under the Kim
Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung governments.32 This is probably because, like the
authoritarian government, the two civilian governments were not free of the
temptation to use the prosecution for their political purposes.
There has been criticism of the organizational principle of prosecutors after
democratization. It is called the "principle of the uniformity of prosecutors"
[Einheit und Unteilbarkeit der Staatsanwaltschaft], which guarantees uniformity
and fairness of the investigative and prosecutorial authority. The problem occurs
because according to the principle, "prosecutors shall obey the prosecutors in
higher office in prosecutorial affairs. 33 In the cases involving powerful politicians
or high-ranking government officials, prosecutors in charge had to unwillingly quit
their investigation, often facing pressure or persuasion from prosecutors in higher
office, and through the Supreme Prosecutor's Office, the ruling political party has
27. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 196(1).
28. See Speedy Trial Procedure Act [cheukkyeolsimpan cheolchabeop], Law No. 4131, June 16,
1989, at arts. 14(2), (3) (according to Article 14 (1), the defendant is entitled to request a regular trial if
the defendant is not satisfied with the judgment in the "Speedy Trial").
29. See JuKAN HANKUK [Korea Weekly], May 20, 1999 (No. 1777), available at
http://www.hk.co.kr/whan/last/990520/w615215.htm (last visited Nov. 14,2002).
30. See Prosecutors' Office Law [keomchalcheongbop], Law No. 3882, Dec. 31, 1986, revised by
Law No. 5430, Dec. 13, 1997, at art. 4(l).
31. See Ahn, supra note 5, at 112 (describing the Korean system in which prosecutors share the
same position as judges, and that the same rules apply to both prosecutors and judges in promotions,
transfers and salary).
32. See In Sup Han, A Dilemma of Public Prosecution of Political Corruption, in RECENT
TRANSFORMATION OF KOREAN SOCIETY AND LAW 369 (Yoon Dae-Kyu ed., Seoul National University
Press, 2000).
33. See Prosecutors' Office Law, supra note 30, at art. 7(1).
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kept a substantial influence on the prosecutors in charge of the cases.34
Consequently, public distrust of the prosecution has increased.
Many academics and civic organizations such as "People's Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy" (PSPD or Chamyeoyeondae)35 have strongly requested
to revise the principle, and the request was partly accepted by the Ministry of
Justice. In 2001, the Ministry of Justice announced that the Prosecutor's Office
Law would be revised to guarantee the protest right of prosecutors against an
improper order of the prosecutor in higher office.36
2. Reshaped Judicial Warrant System for Custody
The CPC provides two types of warrant systems for the custody of persons.
First, the 1995 amendment of the CPC has established a new "arrest warrant"
system, which aims to abolish the illegal police practice of evading the "detention
warrant" system. If there is "probable cause" to believe that a suspect has
committed a crime and would not cooperate with the investigative authorities'
request to come to the police station, the authorities can only arrest the suspect
with a warrant issued by a judge.37
Three exceptions to the warrant requirement are: (i) emergency arrests
exceptions, 38 (ii) flagrant offenders exceptions, 39 and (iii) semi-flagrant offenders
exceptions. 40 These exceptions are legitimizing rules 41 which bring them into line
with pre-existing police practice. If a suspect has been arrested without a warrant, a
detention warrant should be filed within forty-eight hours or, if not, the suspect
must be released immediately.
42
Second, the CPC also provides the conventional "detention warrant" for both
suspects and defendants, which has stricter requirements and longer periods of
duration than an "arrest warrant." Upon the requests of prosecutors,43 judges will
issue a detention warrant if the suspect or the defendant has no domicile or if there
34. See In Sup Han, supra note 32, at 369.
35. See generally, http://www.pspd.org (stating that the PSPD, founded in 1994, has served as a
watchdog against abuses of power and has led the movement towards prosecutorial reform in Korea).
36. See DONG-A ILBO [hereinafter "Dong-A Newspaper"], Oct. 13, 2001; HANKYOREH
[hereinafter "Hankyoreh Newspaper"], Oct. 13, 2001.
37. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 200-2(1) (providing that only the prosecutor may request the
issuance of a warrant, police officers can submit the request for issuance of a detention warrant to the
prosecutor, not directly to ajudge).
38. See KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 12(3); CPC, supra note 6, at art. 200-3(l).
39. See KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 12(3); CPC, supra note 6, at art. 212.
40. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 211(2), which covers:
(i) persons being pursued as an offender with hue and cry; (ii) persons carrying
criminally acquired goods, weapons, or other objects which apparently appear to
have been used for the offense; (iii) persons who bearing on their bodies or clothing
conspicuous traces of the offense; and (iv) persons who flee when challenged.
41. See ANDREW SANDERS & RICHARD YOUNG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21 (1994).
42. See CPC, supra note 6, at arts. 201(4),(5), 207(1),(2).
43. See id. at arts. 202, 203 (providing, as does the arrest system, that only the public prosecutor
may request the issuance of a detention warrant).
VOL. 30:3
"CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION" OF KOREA
is "probable cause" to believe that the suspect or defendant may destroy evidence
or attempt to escape."
A detained suspect must be released by the police if he/she is not transferred
to the prosecutor within ten days.45 At the end of the ten days of detention, the
prosecutor may request another additional ten days to a judge before he/she must
either prosecute or release the suspect.46 In brief, including the forty-eight hours in
case of the warrantless arrest, the investigative authorities have up to thirty-two
days to detain a suspect before filing prosecution.47
3. Bolstered Rights to Silence and Counsel-Korean Version of Miranda and
Massiah
The rights to silence and counsel have been strengthened. Upon arrest or
detention, suspects and defendants are entitled to be informed of the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel.4 The Korean Supreme Court has bolstered
these two rights since democratization. In 1992, the Court made a landmark
decision, which is often called the Korean version of Miranda.49 It held as follows:
Article 200 (2) provides that prosecutors or policemen should
inform a present suspect of the right to silence before
interrogation. The right is based on the privilege against self-
incrimination, which is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Therefore, the statements elicited without informing of the right
to silence in interrogation are illegally obtained evidence, and so
should be excluded, even if they are disclosed voluntarily.50
In two National Security Law violation cases in the 1990s,51 the Court also
44. See CPC, supra note 6, at arts. 70, 201(3).
45. See id. at art. 202.
46. See id. at arts. 202, 203, 205.
47. See National Security Law, No. 3318 (1980) (S. Korea) [hereinafter "NSL"]. Korea's National
Security Law adds 20 days to the periods listed in the CPC. Article 19 of the NSL allows the judges to
give permission of extension of the period to the police one more time, and to prosecutor two more
times. Such extensions have been almost automatic in NSL cases, commonly leaving the suspects
detained for a total of 50 days before prosecution begins. The Constitutional Court held Article 19
unconstitutional if it applies to the crimes of Articles 7 and 10 of the NSL. See Decision of Apr. 14,
1992, 90 heon ma 82, at 5 Do (Korean Constitution Court). See generally Kuk Cho, Tension Between
the National Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea: Security for What?, 15 B. U. INT'L L.
J. 125, 173 (1997) (asserting that, in Korea, criminal suspects are subject to a very lengthy pre-
indictment detention and interrogation in contrast to other industrial countries).
48. See THE KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 12(5); CPC, supra note 6, at art. 200(2); Rules
for Criminal Procedure [hyeongsasosong kyuchik], at art. 127.
49. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
50. See Decision of June 26, 1992, 92 Do 682 [Korean Supreme Court]. This case is popularly
called the "20th Century Faction Case" because the defendant was a leader of a criminal organization
called "20th Century Faction" [yisip sekipa].
51. See Decision of Aug. 24, 1990, 90 Do 1285 [Korean Supreme Court]. This case is popularly
called the "Legislator Seo Kyeong-Weon Case"; Decision of Sept. 25, 1990, 90 Do 1586 [Korean
Supreme Court]. This case is popularly called the "Artist Hong Seong-Dam Case".
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made benchmark decisions, which may be called the Korean version of Massiah.52
In these cases, the defendants requested to meet their attorney when they were
detained but the National Security Agency officers rejected their request. Then the
defendants were referred to and interrogated by the prosecutor. The Court held that
the defendants' self-incriminating statements were illegally obtained for violating
their right to counsel, and so excluded, holding as follows:
Article 12(4) of the Constitution provides people with the right
to assistance from counsel when arrested or detained,
accordingly Articles 30 and 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code
prescribe the right of suspects or defendants to appoint counsel
and communicate with counsel when they are in custody. The
right to counsel like this constitutes the nucleus of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to assistance from counsel....
The limitation of the right to meet and communicate with
counsel violates the constitutionally guaranteed basic right, so
the illegally obtained confession of the suspect should be
excluded, and the exclusion means a substantial and complete
exclusion. 3
The exclusionary rules of Miranda and Massiah are received in Korea from
across the Pacific, although they are often criticized as truth-impairing and pro-
criminal in their home country.54 The reason may be that the Korean judiciary has
faced problems that the Warren Court, not the Burger-Rehnquist Courts, did in the
United States.
It would be a "legalistic notion"55 to expect that these landmark decisions
automatically lead to change of the police. Criminal justice is a social as well as a
legal institution. The instrumental value in controlling the police has not been
confirmed yet. It is certain, however, that the decisions cannot be explicitly
rejected by the police, although they can be tacitly distorted. Now the police must
adjust themselves to them in any way. Although they alone cannot enhance the
guarantee of the individual's procedural rights, they provide legal grounds for
individual suspects to challenge the police misconduct.
4. Newly Established "Substantial Review" and Habeas Corpus Systems
To remove the abuse of detention, the 1995 amendment of the CPC newly
introduced the preliminary hearing system for issuing a detention warrant. Before
52. See generally Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
53. See Decision of Sept. 25, 1990, supra note 51.
54. See OFF. OF LEGAL POL'Y, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'Truth in Criminal Justice' Series Office of
Legal Policy: The Law of Pretrial Interrogation, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 437, 535-36, 618 (1989); Akhil
Reed Amar, Twenty-fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Foreword. Sixth Amendment First
Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 644 (1996). See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Rende B. Lettow, Fifth
Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857 (1995); JOSEPH D.
GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993).
55. See David Dixon, Common Sense, Legal Advice and the Right to Silence, 1991 PUBLIC LAW
233,253.
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issuing a detention warrant, the judge, upon his/her own initiative, can schedule a
hearing for a substantial review of the necessity of the detention of the suspect,
arrested or not, in which the suspect must participate. 6 Before 1995, there was no
hearing system. Rather, the judge issued the detention warrant after reviewing only
the documents referred by the prosecutor.
Because of strong resistance from the investigative authorities, however, the
new system was revised in 1997 to work only upon the request of the suspect or
his/her lawyer.57 The investigative authorities are required to inform the suspect or
defense lawyer that the suspect is entitled to request the hearing.
58
The CPC also provides habeas corpus for the arrested or detained suspect to
review the legality and properness of the arrest or detention.59 The 1997
amendment newly established the bail system for suspects who have requested
habeas corpus.60 Although it is limited because it is not available for suspects who
have not requested habeas corpus, it is certainly an important advancement.
5. Search-and-Seizure and Inspection Warrant
The CPC requires a judicial warrant for search-and-seizure and inspection.61
The exceptions to the warrant requirement are: search-and-seizure and inspection
incident to arrest on warrant, emergency arrest, arrest of flagrant offenders,
detention on warrant,62 emergency search-and-seizure, and inspection on the spot
of committed crimes.
63
B. Prosecution
1. Discretionary Prosecution
At the conclusion of the investigation, the prosecutor has discretionary power
whether or not to prosecute. It is called the "principle of opportunity"
[Opportunitatsprinzip]. The prosecutor can exercise his/her discretionary power
not to bring the case to court when he/she believes that the alleged facts do not
constitute a crime or that there is insufficient evidence to prove the case. The
prosecutor is also authorized to suspend prosecution in consideration of the
suspect's age, character, motive of crime, or other circumstances, even if
incriminating evidence against the suspect is sufficient for prosecution. 64 With
56. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 201(3).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 98-102. See also CPC, supra note 6, at 201(4).
58. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 201(2).
59. See THE KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 12(6); CPC, supra note 6, at arts. 201(1), 214.
60. See CPC, supra note 6, at arts. 201(4), 214.
61. See id. at art. 215.
62. Id. at art. 216(1), (2).
63. Id. at art. 216(3).
64. Id. at art. 247(l). Like the Japanese criminal justice system, the Korean system as a
Continental system did not adopt the German principle of compulsory prosecution (Legalitasprinzip).
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
neither a grand jury system nor private prosecution, the prosecutor has the
exclusive authority to institute prosecution.
Because of the monopoly of investigative power and wide discretion in the
prosecution, the Korean criminal justice system is often called a "prosecutorial
justice" system. As noted above, Korean prosecutors have often been criticized for
their reluctance to investigate corruption cases involving powerful politicians or
high-ranking government officials, or for their politically biased investigation of
the cases. For the last decade, the opposition party and civic organizations have
argued for establishing independent counsel to investigate such cases.
65
In particular, two cases in 1999 aggravated the criticism of the prosecution.
The first was the case engaging the national security section of the prosecution
attempting to induce a strike to suppress the labor union, inflicting significant
damage on the idea of the neutrality of prosecution. 6 The second was the case
involving an attempted lobby to the Prosecutor General' wife, provoking
considerable doubt of the prosecutor's determination for investigation. 6' As a
result, the U.S style "special prosecutor" system for investigation and prosecution
of the cases was adopted.68 In 2001, another case relating to an illegal lobby
toward politicians and government officials 69 led to the legislation of another
"special prosecutor" act.70 It is another example that an American legal invention,
which is not welcomed in its home country,7' is implanted in Korea across the
Pacific.
For more information regarding the German principle, see Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The Discretionary
Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 508 (1970); John H.
Leingbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 439 (1974); Thomas
Weigend, Continental Cures for American Ailments: European Criminal Procedure as a Model for Law
Reform, 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 400-04 (1980). For more
information regarding the discretionary prosecution in Japan, see Shigemitsu Dando, System of
Discretionary Prosecution in Japan, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 518 (1970); B. J. George, Jr., Discretionary
Authority of Public Prosecutors in Japan, 17 LAw IN JAPAN 42 (1984); Marcia E. Goodman, The
Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan, 5 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 16 (1986).
65. See Kuk Cho, A Study on the Adoption of the Special Prosecutor System [teukbyeolkeomsache
doip e kwanhan ilko], 12 Criminal Law Review [hyeongsabyob yonku] 421, 422-25 (1999).
66. See Dong-A Newspaper, Jun. 8, 1999; Hankyoreh Newspaper, Jun. 8, 1999.
67. See Calls for Special Prosecutor Intensify After Fruitless Hearing on 'Fur-gate,' THE KOREA
HERALD, Aug. 27, 1999.
68. SeeAct for Appointment of Special Prosecutors for the Investigation of the Strike Inducement
Case and the Lobby to Prosecutor General's Wife Case [hankukchopyegongsa payeip yudo sagein mit
keomchalchongfang buin e daehan dotlobby sageon euhok sageon chinsang kyumyeong eul wihan
teukbyeolkeomsa eui immyeong e kwanhanpeopryul] (Law No. 6031, Sept. 30, 1999).
69. See Assembly Faces Dispute Over Lobbying Scandal, THE KOREA HERALD, Oct. 4, 2001.
70. See Act for the Appointment of Special Prosecutors for the Investigation of the Mr. Lee Yong-
Ho Gate [hjusikhoesa GNG daepyoisa Lee Yong-Ho eui chukajojak hoengryeong sakeon mit ewa
kwanryeon toen cheongkwankye lobby euihok sakeon teungeui chinsangkyumyeong eul wihan
teukbyeolkeomsa eui immyeong teung e kwanhan peopryul] (Law No. 6520, Nov. 26, 2001).
71. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Julie R. O'Sullivan, The
Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 463 (1996); Joseph E.
diGenova, The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time to End a Bad Idea, 86 GEO. L.J. 2299 (1998);
Philip B. Heymann, Four Unresolved Questions About the Responsibilities of an Independent Counsel,
86 GEO. L. J. 2119 (1998).
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Prosecutors robustly have opposed the "special prosecutor" system because
the system allows exceptions for their monopolized authority of investigation and
prosecution.72 To restore the public trust, however, the Ministry of Justice recently
announced it would establish the "Special Office of Investigation" for the
corruption cases involving politicians or high-ranking government officials, which
is located in the hierarchy of prosecutors, but not under the direct command of the
Prosecutor General.73
2. Defendant's Right to Bail
Upon prosecution, the accused has the right to be released on bail. 74 A request
for bail is permitted, except in a number of circumstances prescribed in article 95
of the CPC.75 The court may also permit a release on bail of its own accord
regardless of the exceptions in the CPC.
76
C. Trial by Professional Judge77
Because the Korean criminal justice system adopts neither the U.S. jury
system nor the German mixed judge system [Schffengericht], a defendant is
found guilty and given a sentence solely by a professional judge. 78 Although some
academics argued for the adoption of the citizen's participation system in the
court, 79 the Korean judiciary has been reluctant to adopt it.8 0
Cases which involve offenses punishable by capital punishment, life
imprisonment, or an imprisonment for not less than one year, are tried by a three-
judge court.8' All other cases are heard by a single judge.8 2 Trials are open to the
public, except in those rare instances where national security, public morals, or the
72. See generally, O'Sullivan, supra note 73. See also, DiGenova, supra note 73.
73. See Dong-A Newspaper, supra note 31; Hankyoreh Newpaper, supra note 31.
74. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 95. See also infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
75. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 95.
76. Id. at art. 96.
77. See id. at arts. 448(1), 450, 453(1). The CPC provides for a "Summarized Trial" when the
offense is punishable by a fine and the procedure begins upon the prosecutor's request. The judge may
either give summary judgment without holding any hearing, or transfer the case for regular trial
procedure. Either the prosecutor or the defendant can request a formal trial within 7 days from the date
of receiving a summary judgment.
78. See THE KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 27(1).
79. See PARK HONG-KYU, DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY: JUDGING THE TRIAL [sabeop
eui minjuhwa: chaepan eul chaepan handa] (1994); PARK HONG-KYU, CITIZENS MUST JUDGE![Simin i
chaepan eul] (2000) (Professor Park Hong-Kyu is a rigorous advocate for the system). In 2001, the
Korean Criminology Association also held a symposium to check up the issue of the citizens'
participation in the court. See generally 13 KOREAN J. CRIMINOLOGY [hyeongsa cheongchaek] 265-380
(2001).
80. See Ahn, supra note 5, at 115.
81. See Court Organization Law [beopweonchojikbeop] (Law No. 3992, Dec. 4, 1987), at art.
32(1).
82. Id. at art. 7(4).
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privacy of individuals are at risk.83
A trial cannot proceed in the absence of defense counsel when the defendant
has been charged with an offense punishable by the death penalty or a prison
sentence of more than three years.84 In addition to the above situations, the trial
judge must also appoint defense counsel when the defendant is a minor, seventy
years or older, suspected of mental illness, or when he/she is indigent.85 The
defendant has the right to remain silent during the trial, 86 and the judge should
inform the defendant of that right.
8 7
IV. RESTRICTION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUEST IN THE INFERIOR LAWS AND
POLICE PRACTICES
This section examines the main provisions of the CPC, the Police Duty Act,88
and police practices which disturb the change in the Constitution and overshadow
constitutional procedural rights.
A. "Voluntary Accompaniment" under the Police Duty Law
In addition to the warrantless arrest exceptions in the Constitution and the
CPC, Korean police have depended on a more convenient way to avoid the warrant
requirement: "voluntary accompaniment" under the Police Duty Act.
The Act is the Korean version of the U.S. Terry stop system.89 The police may
stop and question a suspicious individual and request him or her to go voluntarily
to a nearby police station, if there is probable cause to believe that the individual
has committed or is about to commit a crime, or knows of committed crimes or
crimes which are about to be committed.90 Since the "voluntary accompaniment" is
not officially a compulsory measure, the constitutional restrictions for warrants do
not attach.
However the standard to decide the "probable cause" in the Police Duty Law
is not clear.9' In police practice, to use American terminology, it can be easily
observed that the stop-and-question is made on "vague suspicion ',92 or "inchoate
83. See THE KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 109, Court Organization Law, supra note 81, at
art. 57(1).
84. CPC, supra note 6, at arts. 282, 283.
85. Id. art. 33.
86. Id. art. 289.
87. See Rules for Criminal Procedure, supra note 48, at art. 127.
88. See Police Duty Act [kyeongchalkwan chiknujiphaengbeop], Law No. 3427, Apr. 13, 1981.
89. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
90. Police Duty Act, supra note 88, at arts. 3(1) & (2).
91. Despite the identical terminology, it is generally accepted that the "probable cause" in the
Police Duty Law is less strict than that of the arrest and detention system in the CPC. See Lee JAE-
SANG, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW [hyeongsasosongbeop] 182 (5th ed., 1998); BAE JONG-DAE & LEE
SANG-DON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW [hyeongsasosongbeop] 191 (3rd ed., 1998).
92. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,48 (1979); U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. I,passim (1989).
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and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'" 9 which Terry does not permit. In
particular, the individual who is asked to voluntarily accompany the officer to the
police station is not often given the "freedom to leave" 94 at any time. Thus, as a
practical matter, the "voluntary accompaniment" in many cases is an illegal arrest.
B. Possible Abuse of Emergency Arrest
The Constitution and the CPC provide the emergency arrest exception for the
warrant requirements. 9 The emergency arrest is a warrantless arrest, but the CPC
requires that the detention warrant, not the arrest warrant, be filed within 48
hours.96 Furthermore, the CPC does not provide a time limit for the judge to issue
the warrant.
In the case of an emergency arrest, therefore, the warrantless arrest without
any judicial control 97 is legitimatized for more than 48 hours. As a result, the
police tend not to pursue the arrest on the warrant, but depend on the emergency
arrest because it is free of any warrant requirement and gives them much time to
interrogate the suspect without any judicial control.
C. Limitation of the Judicial "Substantial Review"for the Detention Warrant
The newly established "substantial review" for the detention warrant is a
significant step for removing the abuse of detention. However, upon the 1997
amendment, a hearing is available only upon the request of the suspect or his/her
lawyer. 98 In light of the Article 12(3) of the Constitution, which requires that
judicial warrants be obtained in due process, the amendment is nevertheless
retrogressive.
On the other hand, the 1997 amendment is against Article 9(3) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 99 which the Korean
government ratified in April 1990. The Article stipulates that "anyone arrested or
detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge."'' 0 The
Covenant requires a mandatory and immediate preliminary hearing. The 1997
amendment also does not match with the hearing systems in contemporary
democratic countries. For instance, in the United States, arrested suspects are
entitled to a post-arrest probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours. I0' In
93. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 14.
94. See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544-45, 554, 560 (1980).
95. THE KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 12(3); CPC, supra note 6, at art. 200-3(1).
96. CPC, supra note 6, at arts. 200-2(5), 200-4(2).
97. Id. at art. 200-3(2) (suggesting that the police should get the prosecutor's approval after, not
before, the emergency arrest).
98. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 201-2(1).
99. See generally G. A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966). The Korean government made a reservation of Articles 14-5, 14-7, 22.
100. Id.
101. See Gernstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44
(1991).
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Germany, arrested suspects must be released or brought before a magistrate by the
end of the day following the arrest. 1
02
D. "Arrest on Separate Crimes ": Police Tactic to Extend Detention
Besides voluntary accompaniment, Korean investigative authorities have
contrived a hidden trick to extend the detention of the arrestee: "arrest on separate
crimes," which literally means arrest for a separate incident. 1 3 It is a technique in
which the police extend the period of detention for their initial investigation of a
serious crime by first obtaining an arrest warrant for relatively minor crimes.
During the period of interrogation given by the arrest warrant on the minor crimes,
the police continue interrogating the suspect regarding the initially pursued crime.
In brief, "arrest on separate crimes" is an illegal device for obtaining custody
of a suspect and eliciting the desired confession when there is insufficient evidence
for arrest on the crime in chief and a means of circumventing the warrant
requirement. 104
E. Limited Release on Bail
The current bail system is very limited. First, only suspects who have
requested habeas corpus are eligible for bail. 10 5 As a result, a suspect who has not
requested habeas corpus may be detained by the police for up to ten days, 0 6 which
is too long when compared to other democratic countries. However, the basic
purpose of bail is different from that of habeas corpus. The former, based on the
legal and proper warrant, is for operating reasonably the detention system and
giving the suspect the full chance to prepare for a trial. The latter is for judicial
control of illegal or improper detention. 107 Thus there cannot be found any reason
why the bail system is limited to the suspects who have requested habeas corpus.
Second, the defendant's right to bail is substantially circumscribed by a
number of potential exceptions. The exceptions are as follows: (i) the defendant
has committed a crime punishable by capital punishment, life imprisonment or an
imprisonment for more than ten years; (ii) the defendant is a habitual or chronic
offender; (iii) there are sufficient grounds to believe that the defendant may destroy
evidence; (iv) there are sufficient grounds to believe that the defendant may
attempt to escape; (v) the defendant's domicile is not clear; or (vi) there are
sufficient grounds to believe that the defendant may inflict harm on the life, body
and property of the victim, possible witness or their relatives.1'8 Because of the
wide range of exceptions, the right to bail has become fragile.
102. See The German Criminal Procedure Code [StPO] [hereinafter GCPC] art. 128(1).
103. See LEE, supra note 91, at 238; BAE JONG-DAE & LEE SANG-DON, supra note 91, at 230; SHiN
DONG-WOON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW I [hyeongsasosongbeop] 184 (2nd ed., 1997).
104. Id.
105. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 214-2(4).
106. Id. at art. 202.
107. See LEE, supra note 91, at 257; SHIN DONG-WOON, supra note 103, at 220-21.
108. CPC, supra note 6, at art. 95.
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F. Insufficient Guarantee of the Right to Counsel
First, like other Continental criminal justice systems, 10 9 the Korean criminal
justice system is not equipped with the public defender system. The Constitution
provides a state-appointed counsel only for the criminally accused persons after the
institution of prosecution. 1 0 Suspects before the institution of prosecution, who are
financially poor or otherwise unable to retain counsel, are not entitled to the right
to counsel at public expense.
Second, according to the investigative practice, the counsel retained by
suspects once formally arrested is not permitted to attend interrogation sessions
although the right to counsel provision in either the Constitution or the CPC does
not provide any implication to prohibit the counsel's participation. This is a
striking contrast to Miranda, which made it clear that the suspect has a right to
have present an attorney during the police interrogation."' As a result, the suspect,
even if he/she gets an attorney, is cast without any professional aids in the critical
stage of criminal procedure.
In a recent announcement in 2001, the Ministry of Justice expressed their
scheme for providing state-appointed counsel for indigent suspects before the
institution of prosecution and for the counsel's participation in police interrogation
with some exceptions in 2002.12 If the scheme is accomplished, Miranda would
materialize in Korea in a full version.
V. THE KOREAN SUPREME COURT'S RELUCTANCE TO EXCLUDE THE TAINTED
CONFESSION AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
A. Confession
The Constitution and the CPC provide explicit legal provisions regarding the
exclusion of an involuntary confession. Article 12(7) of the Constitution provides
for the exclusion of involuntary confessions made under torture, battery, threat,
deceit or after prolonged custody." 3 Following Article 12(7), the CPC also
109. See GCPC, supra note 87, at § 141(1). See also KLEINKNECHT/MEYER-GOBER,
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG § 163, no. 16. (43 ed., 1997); Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German
Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solution?, 18 B.C.
INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 317, 334 (1995).
110. See THE KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 12(4).
111. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
112. See Dong-A Newspaper, Nov. 1, 2001; Hankyoreh Newpaper, Nov. 1,2001.
113. See THE KOREAN CONST., supra note 4, at art. 12(7).
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provides an exclusionary rule for confessions whose voluntariness is doubtful.l1
4
In 1994, the Korean National Congress also ratified the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article
15 of which provides "any statement which is established to have been made as a
result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except
against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made."
15
Relying on these provisions, the Korean Supreme Court has excluded
involuntary confessions in a number of cases. 1 6 After democratization, as
reviewed above, self-incriminating statements elicited without informing of the
right to silence or while violating the right to counsel have also been excluded as
illegally obtained confession by the Court as well." I7 Barbaric torture in
interrogation seemed to disappear after democratization, and Lee Geun-Ahn, who
was a notorious torture specialist, known for cruelly torturing Kim Geun-Tae and
other democratization movement activists under the authoritarian regime, was
sentenced to a seven-year imprisonment in 2000.' 18 However, illegal methods of
interrogation, including all-night sleepless interrogation, still exist." 9
The Korean Supreme Court often does not listen to the defendant's statement
of being mistreated by the police unless bodily injury has been proven or witnesses
have testified.' 20  The Court does not regard the surroundings of police
interrogation as inherently coercive, holding that "[s]uch circumstances which
make statement involuntary are specially exceptional, so we should understand that
the voluntariness of the statement is presumed."'
12 1
Consequently, the defendant, in a practical sense, is often required to satisfy
the burden of proof to prove the existence of illegal police conduct. It is a positive
advancement that the Court recently imposed upon prosecutors the burden of proof
when the voluntariness of confession is in dispute. 122 On the other hand, illegal
114. See CPC, supra note 6, at art. 309.
115. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, at art. 15.
116. See, e.g., Decision of Apr. 26, 1977, 77 Do 210 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Jan. 31,
1978, 77 Do 463 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of July 28, 1981, 80 Do 2688 (Korean Supreme
Court); Decision of Oct. 13, 1981, 81 Do 2160 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of June 8, 1982, 82
Do 850 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Mar.13, 1984, 84 Do 36 (Korean Supreme Court);
Decision of May 9, 1984, 83 Do 2782 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Feb. 26, 1985, 82 Do 4213
(Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Jan. 31, 1989, 88 Do 680 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of
Feb. 26, 1985, 82 Do 2413 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Mar. 10, 1992, 91 Do I (Korean
Supreme Court); Decision of Nov. 24, 1992, 92 Do 2409 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Sep. 28,
1993, 93 Do 1843 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Jun. 27, 1997, 95 Do 1964 (Korean Supreme
Court).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
118. See Dong-A Newspaper, Sep. 27, 2000; Hankyoreh Newspaper, Sep. 27, 2000.
119. See LEE, supra note 91, at 486; BAE & LEE, supra note 103, at 528.
120. See PARK SANG-KI & TAK HWEE-SUNG, A STUDY ON CONFESSION RULES 200-01 [jabaek eui
emeuseong Ikva cheungkeoneongryeok e kwanhan yonku] (1997).
121. Decision of Mar. 8, 1983, 82 Do 3248 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of June 26, 1984, 84
Do 748 (Korean Supreme Court).
122. See Decision of Apr. 10, 1998, 97 Do 3234 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Jan. 21,
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police conduct itself does not lead to the exclusion of the confession. The Court
does not always exclude the tainted confession even if illegal police conduct was
found, but rather requires that the illegal conduct be a direct cause of the
confession. 123 Accordingly, the deterrent effect of Article 12 (7) of the Constitution
and the Article 309 of CPC is significantly diminished.
B. Physical Evidence
The Korean Supreme Court has consistently declined to exclude the physical
evidence obtained by illegal search-and-seizure, and has provided the following
rationale, "[e]ven though the procedure of seizure was illegal, the value as
evidence does not change because the procedure did not affect the quality and
shape of the substance itself."'
24
The Court clearly rejected the U.S. Fourth Amendment Mapp exclusionary
rule. 25 Unless the illegally-obtained evidence is excluded, the constitutional
requirement for the search-and-seizure warrant is left without strong teeth. There
are no other effective remedies for illegal police misconduct in Korea. Criminal or
civil liability and internal discipline have not shown promise to deter the police
misconduct in Korea, like in the United States.
126
Neither the Constitution nor the CPC has a provision regarding the exclusion
of illegally obtained physical evidence. However it is necessary to note that,
despite the same lack of a provision for an exclusionary rule, the Japanese
Supreme Court made a "legislative" decision in Japan v. Hashimoto in 1978,12
accepting the deterrence rationale of the Mapp. Without an exclusionary rule, the
constitutional requirement for the search-and-seizure warrant would remain
virtually unenforced because the Constitution and the CPC lack any means to
restrain unreasonable search-and-seizure by government officials.1 28 Considering
this situation, the Korean Legislature should add a provision of the exclusionary
2000, 99 Do 4940 (Korean Supreme Court)
123. See Decision of Nov. 27, 1984, 84 Do 2252 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Feb. 8,
1985, 84 Do 2630 (Korean Supreme Court).
124. See Decision of Sept. 17, 1968, 68 Do 932 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of June 23,
1987, 87 Do 705 (Korean Supreme Court); Decision of Feb. 8, 1994, 93 Do 3318 (Korean Supreme
Court).
125. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
126. See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 429
(1974); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665,
756 (1970); Hans W. Baade, Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Comparative
Study of A Classical Mismatch, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 1325, 1349 (1973); Milton A. Loewenthal,
Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REv. 24, 29 (1980).
127. See Decision of Sept. 7, 1978, Saikosai (Japanese Supreme Court), 32 Keishu 1672. This case
is called the "Osaka Tenno Temple Drug Seizure Case." Its English translation is available in
LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH
1990 427-34 (1996). For more information regarding the Japanese criminal justice system, see Kuk
Cho, Japanese "Prosecutorial Justice" and Its Limited Exclusionary Rule, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
(1998).
128. See LEE, supra note 91, at 493; SHIN DONG-WOON, supra note 103, at 153; BAE & LEE, supra
note 91, at 507.
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rule in the CPC like the U.K. Parliament,1 9 or the Korean Supreme Court should
take Mapp more seriously like the Japanese Supreme Court.
In this context, it is worthwhile to pay attention to the newly legislated
"Communication Secrecy Protection Act,'' 130 which explicitly provides for the
exclusion of illegally obtained mails and electronic communications. 13
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1987 Constitution has provided a new perspective for the
constitutionalization of criminal procedure. The institutional reform of criminal
procedure and the progressive decisions of the Court may be called the Korean
"criminal procedure revolution."'132 However the domination of the crime control
value under the authoritarian regime was not easily overturned. Although the 1988
and 1995 amendments of the CPC have provided the new system with procedural
rights for criminal suspects and defendants, they do not represent the one-sided
victory of the due process value over the crime control value, but a compromise
between the two values. Particularly with regard to pre-indictment detention and
interrogation, the imbalance between the rights of individuals and the power of the
law enforcement authorities is institutionalized in favor of the latter. The
provisions made based on the due process are also curbed by the conventional
police practice.
The "criminal procedure revolution" has been launched, but it is undoubtedly
not finished in Korea. To advance the "revolution," the rights of criminal suspects
and defendants should be taken more seriously in Korean society, and the
legislative and judicial endeavors to control the overgrown power of the
investigative authorities should be reinforced.
129. See PACE at § 78(1) (providing that "the court may refuse to allow evidence ... if it appears to
the court that ... the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.") The exclusionary rule of section 78(1) is called the
"unfairness test." See Kuk Cho, Reconstruction of English Criminal Justice and Its Revigorated
Exclusionary Rules, 21 LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 259 (1999).
130. See The Communication Secrecy Protection Act [tongshinbimil bohobeopl, Law No. 4650,
Dec. 27, 1993.
131. See id. at art. 4.
132. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law
Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 16-18 (1988) (stating that there were three themes in the U.S.
"criminal procedure revolution" led by the Warren Court: (i) pursuit of equality, which is the effort to
stamp out not only racial discrimination but also to insure fair treatment for rich and poor alike, (ii)
concern with the dangers of unchecked executive power and reinforcement of adversarial procedure and
(iii) a preoccupation with practical implementation beyond declaring new rights).
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